Introduction
By way of introduction, I should briefly situate this chapter. Unlike most contributors to this volume, I did not participate in the conference in Oslo with a distinct paper on Nordic approaches to international law. I was part of the 1 I am grateful for comments from and discussion with participants at the conference on "A Nordic Approach closing round-table, the aim of which was to round up and suggest further perspectives on the many rich and thoughtful discussions that had taken place during the three days in the beautiful surroundings of Lysebu. The convenor Astrid Kjeldgaard-Pedersen had invited me for this panel not as an international lawyer, but as a legal philosopher -and, in particular, as one who has spent quite some time studying the scholarship of Scandinavian Legal Realism and notably the works of Alf Ross.3 If beside the notion of a possibly distinct approach to international law, there is anything in law for which our small region has gained international renown, Scandinavian Legal Realism seems to be the best candidate.4 Kjeldgaard-Pedersen was therefore interested in exploring whether or not, at the closing of the conference, it might be possible to discern traces of congeniality between Scandinavian Realism and Nordic approaches to international law. At the conference, I therefore made my closing remarks from that perspective, focusing on two main issues, on which I shall also focus in the following. Before doing so, however, I presented some more general methodological reflections in light of the conference discussions and main conclusions on Nordic approaches to international law; reflections on the virtues and vices of the conference's predominant "approach to the approach" so to speak. These remarks did not strictly relate to Scandinavian Legal Realism as such. I shall nevertheless briefly recapitulate the main idea in Section 2 ("Approaches to 
